




Leveraged ETFs: The Trojan Horse Has Passed the 
Margin-Rule Gates 
William M. Humphries† 
“When you combine ignorance and leverage, you get some 
pretty interesting results.” 
-Warren Buffet1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
What do the Great Depression, the Great Recession,2 and the de-
mise of Lehman Brothers and Bear Sterns all have in common?  One 
word: leverage.3  The misuse of leverage, in all its forms, contributed 
greatly to all of these events.4  Yet even today, common investors can 
purchase a leveraged exchange-traded fund (leveraged ETF), a complex 
product that uses leverage to increase returns,5 without triggering appli-
cable laws designed to regulate the use of leverage. 
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 1. Ron DeLegge, Should You Use Leverage?, ETFGUIDE.COM (Dec. 19, 2009), 
http://www.etfguide.com/commentary/651/Should-You-Use-Leverage?/. 
 2. Courtney Schlisserman, ‘Great Recession’ Gets Recognition as Entry in AP Stylebook, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=ayoj
B2KWQG4k; see also Chris Isidore, The Great Recession, CNNMONEY.COM (Mar. 25, 2009), 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/25/news/economy/depression_comparisons/index.htm. 
 3. Black’s Law Dictionary defines leverage as “1. Positional advantage; effectiveness. 2. The 
use of credit or borrowed funds (such as buying on margin) to improve one’s speculative ability and 
to increase an investment’s rate of return. 3. The advantage obtained from using credit or borrowed 
funds rather than equity capital.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 990 (9th ed. 2009). 
 4. See DeLegge, supra note 1; see generally MICHAEL G. CROUHY, ROBERT A. JARROW & 
STUART M. TURNBULL, PRESENTATION AT THE 8TH ANNUAL BANK RESEARCH CONFERENCE: 
THE SUBPRIME CREDIT CRISIS OF 2007, FDIC (2007), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/bank
_research_conference/annual_8th/Turnbull_Jarrow.pdf. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
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Leverage is “[t]he use of a small initial investment, credit, or bor-
rowed funds to gain a very high return in relation to one’s invest-
ment . . . .”6  Investing on margin (i.e., borrowing to purchase securities 
and pledging those securities as collateral for the loan) is a traditional 
form of leverage.7  The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
declares that the Great Crash of 1929 laid its foundation: “Tempted by 
promises of ‘rags to riches’ transformations and easy credit, most inves-
tors gave little thought to the systematic risk that arose from widespread 
use of margin financing . . . .”8  The Great Depression followed and 
Congress set out to identify ways to solve the problems created by in-
vesting on margin. 
Since the 1930s, investing on margin has not ceased but, at least in 
the stock market, has been regulated by the margin rules (a set of rules 
created in the 1930s designed to prevent the same mistakes leading to the 
Great Depression).  But the underlying principle learned from the Great 
Depression of exercising caution when using and providing leverage 
such as margin loans has faded, with drastic results.  “Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers, two former Wall Street powerhouses, no longer exist 
because they overleveraged themselves out of business.  These compa-
nies became so addicted to leverage—they destroyed themselves and 
nearly the entire global financial system.”9 
In addition, a desire for yield enhancement10 and greater access to 
leverage caused the credit crisis of 2007, whether through subprime 
mortgages11 for individuals or collateralized debt obligations12 for institu-
                                                            
 6. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1106 (2d ed. 1987). 
 7. FRANK K. REILLY & KEITH C. BROWN, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS & PORTFOLIO 
MANAGEMENT 127 (Mike Reynolds ed., Thomson S.-W. 7th ed. 2003).  Normally, you buy stock X 
at $100 with your own money, it goes up to $150, and you sell stock X for a 50% profit.  When 
investing on margin, however, you buy stock X at $100 with $50 of your own money and $50 bor-
rowed from a broker.  If the stock goes up $150, you have made a 100% profit (minus loan fees).  If 
the stock goes down to $50, you have lost 100% (and you still have to pay loan fees). 
 8. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and 
Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (SEC), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified May 3, 2010). 
 9. DeLegge, supra note 1. 
 10. Yield means “the income produced by a financial investment,” and enhance means “to 
raise to a higher degree.”  RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 444, 1546 (1996).  
Therefore, yield enhancement means to increase one’s income produced by a financial investment to 
a greater level than previously obtained. 
 11. Subprime mortgages are mortgages offered to individuals with higher risks of default than 
the typical qualified or “prime” lender.  In other words, subprime mortgages are home loans for 
people generally ineligible for loans. 
 12. Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) “are financial vehicles that bundle different kinds 
of debt—ranging from corporate bonds, to securities underpinned by mortgages, to debt backed by 
money owed on credit cards—and cut it into slices.  These slices are sold to investors in the form of 
bonds.”  David Reilly, Center of a Storm: How CDOs Work, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2007, at B1. 
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tions.13  Relying on the expected increase in value, individuals took ad-
vantage of greater access to credit to purchase homes they could not af-
ford.14  Financial institutions and companies created and purchased se-
curities with values based on these home loans because of a desire for 
better returns than they could normally obtain. 
Recently, leveraged ETFs became available to provide access to le-
verage and, consequently, higher returns without the restrictions such as 
the rules that limit investing on margin (margin rules).  Leveraged ETFs 
are controversial because they are complex, lightly regulated, and pro-
vide embedded leverage.15  Based on the prior consequences of easy le-
verage and greedy desires for higher yields without limiting regulation, 
should leveraged ETFs be available and, if so, to what extent? 
This Comment articulates the basics surrounding the functions and 
operations of leveraged ETFs and margin rules in order to assess the 
compatibility of the two.  I argue that leveraged ETFs should be limited 
or prohibited because they contravene the purposes of the long-
established margin rules set in place to protect the market and investors. 
Part II explains ETFs and leveraged ETFs.  Part III describes mar-
gin and the margin regulations, including the history behind their intro-
duction and the policy concerns they address.  Part IV analyzes how the 
basic functions and characteristics of leveraged ETFs flout the policy 
considerations underlying the margin rules (preventing excess use of 
credit, protecting investors from too thin a margin, and protecting the 
market from excess volatility), as well as the rules themselves.  Part V 
proposes limitations on leveraged ETFs that would honor margin rule 
policies.  Part VI concludes the Comment with the resolution that leve-
raged ETFs defy the margin rules and, therefore, should be limited if not 
prohibited. 
II.  BASICS OF ETFS 
ETFs provide investors the ability to mirror the performance of 
groups of securities or indices with an investment vehicle that trades like 
a stock and has lower expense ratios than the average mutual fund.16  
                                                            
 13. See CROUHY, JARROW & TURNBULL, supra note 4. 
 14. See id. at 6. 
 15. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. (FINRA), REGULATORY NOTICE 09-31, NON-
TRADITIONAL ETFS: FINRA REMINDS FIRMS OF SALES PRACTICE OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO 
LEVERAGED AND INVERSE EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS (June 2009), http://www.finra.org/web 
/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p118952.pdf.; see also Chuck Jaffe, Leve-
raged EFTs [sic] Are Like Power Tools; They’re Best for Pros, THE NEWS TRIB., Aug. 26, 2010, 
http://www.thenewstribune.com/2009/08/26/856917/leveraged-efts-are-like-power.html. 
 16. What Are ETFs?, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/etfs/what-are-ETFs.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2010) [hereinafter NASDAQ, What Are ETFs?]; see also REILLY & BROWN, 
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ETFs were introduced to the United States’ financial markets in 1993 
with the release of the S&P Depository Receipts Trust 1, or SPDRs, 
(pronounced “spiders”).17  SPDRs tracks the Standard & Poor’s 500 In-
dex18 and continues to be the largest and most popular ETF as noted by 
its total net asset value—total assets minus liabilities divided by the 
number of shares outstanding—of $70.6 billion on November 5, 2009.19  
Since the introduction of the SPDRs fund, hundreds of ETFs have been 
introduced and different varieties have developed.20 
A.  Traditional ETFs 
Generally, ETFs track market indices or other groups of securi-
ties.21  For example, some ETFs track indices such as the Standard & 
Poor’s 500, the NASDAQ 100, or the Dow Jones Industrial Average.22  
Others track a wide variety of securities including stocks, bonds, com-
modities, and even real estate.23  ETFs invest in either all of the securities 
that comprise a particular index or a representative sample.24  Basically, 
ETFs emulate the return of a given index.25 
                                                                                                                                     
supra note 7, at 87, 660 (ETFs are traded like stocks and have lower expense ratios than most mutual 
funds.). 
 17. History of ETFs: From Institutions to Individuals, THE WALL ST. J. ONLINE, 
http://online.wsj.com/ad/focusonetfs/history.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
 18. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index aims to measure the performance of the broad U.S. mar-
ket and economy through changes in the values of 500 of the leading U.S. companies from all major 
industries.  The index moves up and down in value as the values of the 500 largest companies in the 
U.S. change.  It is regarded as the benchmark for U.S. stock performance.  S&P 500, STANDARD & 
POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-500/en/us/?indexId=spusa-500-usduf—p-us-
l— (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
 19. SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY), STATE ST. GLOBAL ADVISORS, 
https://www.spdrs.com/product/fund.seam?ticker=SPY (last visited Mar. 17, 2010); see also Popu-
lar ETFs, YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/etf/education/04 (last visited Mar. 17, 2010). 
 20. A Focus on ETFs, THE WALL ST. J. ONLINE, 
http://online.wsj.com/ad/focusonetfs/focus.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
 21. NASDAQ, What Are ETFs?, supra note 16; see also NASDAQ ETF Family, NASDAQ, 
http://www.nasdaq.com/Structuredeq/nasdaq_etf_family.stm (last visited Mar. 17, 2010); see also 
Market Indices, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/indices.htm (last modified June 26, 2007) (“If 
you open the financial pages of many newspapers, you will find a number of major market indices 
listed. Each of the indices tracks the performance of a specific ‘basket’ of stocks considered to 
represent a particular market or sector of the U.S. stock market or the economy.”). 
 22. NASDAQ, What Are ETFs?, supra note 16. 
 23. All ETF Types, ETFDB, http://etfdb.com/types/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2010) (The site in-
cludes hyperlinks to a variety of different types of ETFs based on the underlying assets.). 
 24. Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs), SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/etf.htm (last modified 
Mar. 18, 2010) [hereinafter SEC, Exchange-Traded Funds]. 
 25. NASDAQ, What Are ETFs?, supra note 16.  When buying shares in an ETF, the investor 
basically purchases shares of a “portfolio that tracks the yield of its native index.”  Id. 
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ETFs are priced and sold like stocks because of the way they are 
formed and the way they function.26  ETFs are formed by a fund manager 
who submits a detailed plan of how the fund will operate to the SEC for 
approval.27  After ETFs are approved and formed, the fund sells large 
blocks of shares (e.g., 50,000 shares) called “Creation Units” to large 
institutional investors28 rather than directly to individual investors like 
you or me.29  Usually, these Creation Units are purchased by institutional 
investors with an assortment of securities that parallel the ETF’s portfo-
lio (i.e., the index it intends to track).30  The holder of the ETF’s shares 
(the large institutional investor) then sells the individual shares that make 
up the Creation Units to individual investors in the secondary market.31  
Only Creation Units can be sold back to the ETF,32 so large institutional 
investors buy up shares in the secondary market and redeem Creation 
Units.33  The buying and selling of Creation Units back to the ETF 
creates arbitrage,34 which allows the ETF to operate like a stock because 
it keeps the value of the ETF consistent with the value of the underlying 
securities.35  If ETF share prices on the secondary market increase above 
the value of the underlying securities, institutional investors buy more 
Creation Units and sell the individual shares of the ETFs on the second-
ary market for more than the per-share cost of the Creation Units.36  The 
opposite is true when ETF share prices are lower than the value of the 
underlying securities.37 
Because of the manner in which ETFs are formed and function, in-
vestors gain attractive benefits.38  First, ETFs generally have lower costs 
than mutual funds because they are traditionally passively managed, 
                                                            
 26. See How ETFs Work, ETFZONE.COM (Jan. 5, 2001), http://www.etfzone.com/?template=vi
ewarticle&article_id=138. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See REILLY & BROWN, supra note 7, at 63.  Institutional investors are just that, institutions 
that invest.  See id.  Examples include insurance companies, hedge funds, and pension funds.  Id.; 
Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from Control, 33 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 877, 881 (2010).  Because institutional investors must invest large sums of money, they 
have the financial ability to buy Creation Units from ETFs. 
 29. SEC, Exchange-Traded Funds, supra note 24. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. ETFZONE.COM, supra note 26. 
 34. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 70 (1996) (“1. the simultaneous sale 
of a security or commodity in different markets to profit from unequal prices.”). 
 35. See ETFZONE.COM, supra note 26. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. How to Choose an Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF), THE WALL ST. J. ONLINE, 
http://guides.wsj.com/personal-finance/investing/how-to-choose-an-exchange-traded-fund-etf/ (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
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meaning the only changes made in an ETF’s portfolio are to adjust it to 
assure the portfolio matches the underlying index or other securities.39  
Generally, ETFs are not actively traded like a mutual fund trying to gain 
the highest return for investors.40  ETFs do not try to outperform the in-
dex, but rather seek to mirror it.41  The reduced trading frequency and 
volume characteristics of ETFs allow for lower transaction and adminis-
trative costs, while also reducing the amount of potential capital-gain 
distributions.42 
Second, investors are provided portfolio diversification without bet-
ting on the talents of fund managers.43  Because ETFs provide returns 
nearly identical to a replicated index, investors are exposed to the diver-
sified holdings of the index and “harness[] the power of the market it-
self” rather than the risky knowledge and skill of an active fund manag-
er.44 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, ETFs are traded like stock, 
providing the investor with flexibility.45  Unlike mutual funds, which are 
purchased for the price of the fund at the close of the previous day (net 
asset value), ETFs are priced and traded continuously.46  The price is 
based on the market value of the underlying index of the ETF.47  In addi-
tion, they can be bought on margin, sold short, or held for long periods.48 
B.  Leveraged ETFs 
Leveraged ETFs are almost identical to traditional ETFs except for 
one significant distinguishing feature: leverage.49  Unlike traditional 
ETFs, leveraged ETFs seek to achieve multiplied returns based on the 
performance of the ETF’s underlying index, group of securities, or other 
                                                            
 39. NASDAQ, What Are ETFs?, supra note 16. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  “ETF shares trade exactly like stocks. . . . ETFs enjoy the additional benefits 
of . . . greater flexibility that goes with investing in entire markets, sectors, regions, or asset types.”  
Id. 
 46. Id.  (“Unlike index mutual funds, which are priced only after market closing, ETFs are 
priced and traded continuously throughout the trading day.”). 
 47. Id.; see also Leveraged and Inverse ETFs: Specialized Products with Extra Risks for Buy-
and-Hold Investors, SEC, http://sec.gov/investor/pubs/leveragedetfs-alert.htm (last modified Aug. 
18, 2009) [hereinafter SEC, Leveraged and Inverse ETFs]. 
 48. NASDAQ, What Are ETFs?, supra note 16. 
 49. See NYSE INFORMED INVESTOR: WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT EXCHANGE 
TRADED FUNDS, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., 4 (2009), http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/what_you_should_know_
about_etfs.pdf [hereinafter NYSE INFORMED INVESTOR]. 
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asset group.50  For example, a leveraged ETF would seek to achieve as 
much as two (200%) or three (300%) times the performance of a tradi-
tional ETF that uses the same underlying index or benchmark.51 
Leveraged ETFs achieve multiplied performance through deriva-
tive52 investments. 53  Rather than simply holding the stocks, bonds, 
commodities, or other securities in a ratio similar to the underlying index 
like traditional ETFs, leveraged ETFs use derivative instruments to 
create leverage.54  “Derivatives are financial instruments whose perfor-
mance is derived, at least in part, from the performance of an underlying 
asset, security or index.  For example, a stock option is a derivative be-
cause its value changes in relation to the price movement of the underly-
ing stock.”55  While understanding the specific mechanics of derivatives 
exceeds the scope of this Comment, one must understand that a leve-
raged ETF does not achieve multiple returns through holding the same 
assets in the same proportion as the benchmarked group of assets.56  
Some other type of investment instrument must multiply the return, or in 
other words, produce leverage.57 
Most leveraged ETFs reset daily.58  This means that leveraged ETFs 
achieve their multiplied performance objectives daily.59  Thus, the return 
                                                            
 50. Id.; see also Press Release, FINRA, SEC Warns Retail Investors About Investing in Leve-
raged or Inverse ETFs (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2009 
/P119820. 
 51. NYSE INFORMED INVESTOR, supra note 49; see also SEC, Leveraged and Inverse ETFs, 
supra note 47.  In addition, both traditional ETFs and leveraged ETFs can be purchased in an inverse 
form called “inverse ETFs” or “inverse leveraged ETFs.”  Id.  Inverse ETFs simply seek the opposite 
performance of the underlying index or benchmark.  Id. 
 52. A derivative is “an instrument whose market value ultimately depends upon, or derives 
from, the value of a more fundamental investment vehicle called the underlying asset or security.”  
REILLY & BROWN, supra note 7 at G-5; see also Kelli A. Alces, Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the 
Corporate Structure, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 787, 799 (2010). 
 53. Swaps are a type of derivative frequently used by leveraged ETFs to achieve their invest-
ment objectives.  Minder Cheng & Ananth Madhavan, The Dynamics of Leveraged and Inverse 
Exchange-Traded Funds, 7 J. INVESTMENT  MGMT. 43 (2009).  Swaps have been scrutinized by 
governments, however, for their risk.  See Stephen Fidler, Gregory Zuckerman & Brian Baskin, 
Swaps Come Under Fire: U.S. Regulators, European Leaders Seek More Oversight on Trades in 
Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2010, at A1.  A part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act deals with the regulation of these swaps and derivative markets in general. 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 701–54, 124 Stat. 1376, 1654–1754 (2010). 
 54. Cheng & Madhavan, supra note 53, § 2.1. 
 55. Derivatives, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/derivative.htm (last modified May 25, 
2000). 
 56. See SEC, Leveraged and Inverse ETFs, supra note 47. 
 57. Cheng & Madhavan, supra note 53, § 2.1.  “[L]everaged returns cannot be created out of 
thin air . . . .”  Id. 
 58. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 09-31, supra note 15.  In other words, leveraged ETFs 
proved daily returns based on a multiple of the underlying benchmark.  See id.  The fund adjusts its 
assets and exposure so that it can provide the stated multiplied return each day, which effectively 
compounds the gains or losses over periods of time.  See id. 
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on the leveraged ETF can differ significantly from that of the underlying 
asset group over a period of time.60  This trait has caused the SEC and 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) to issue warnings 
about the risk to investors of losing money over a period of time even 
though the index or benchmark actually increased over that period.61  For 
example, between December 1, 2008, and April 30, 2009, the Dow Jones 
U.S. Oil & Gas Index gained 2% while a 200% leveraged ETF fell 6% 
and a 200% inverse leveraged ETF fell by 26%.62 
Despite these risks, leveraged ETFs remain popular.63  Like tradi-
tional ETFs, leveraged ETFs are similar to stock because investors can 
buy and sell them throughout the trading day or purchase them on mar-
gin.64  However, unlike stocks and traditional ETFs, leveraged ETFs de-
rive their appeal from their use of leverage.65  Leveraged ETFs remain 
popular because of their opportunity for multiplied returns, despite the 
risk that they will not perfectly mirror the underlying benchmark66 and 
despite the higher costs caused by the need for active management to 
create and maintain the leverage.67 
ETFs remain popular and useful because of their opportunity for 
diversified, flexible, and low-cost investing.68  Leveraged ETFs provide 
similar advantages but add a new level of complexity and risk through 
leverage.69  Traditionally, leverage has been obtained by investing on 
margin—borrowing funds from a broker to purchase stock.  Therefore, in 
order to fully understand ETFs, it is important to understand the history 
                                                                                                                                     
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  For a good example of how the resetting can create differences in returns over a period 
of time, see Understanding the Impact of Changing Market Exposure on Leveraged ETFs, 
DIREXIONSHARES, http://direxionshares.com/pdfs/Compounding_Article_ETFs.pdf (last visited Apr. 
3, 2010). 
 61. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 09-31, supra note 15; see also Press Release, supra note 50.  
FINRA provided the following example of the risk of leveraged ETFs over the long term: 
For example, between December 1, 2008, and April 30, 2009, a leveraged ETF seeking to 
deliver three times the daily return of the Russell 1000 Financial Services Index fell 53 
percent, while the underlying index actually gained approximately 8 percent.  A leve-
raged inverse ETF seeking to deliver three times the inverse of the Russell 1000 Financial 
Services Index’s daily return declined by 90 percent over the same period. 
Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Jason Zweig, The Intelligent Investor: Will Leveraged ETFs Put Cracks in Market Close?, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2009, at B1. 
 64. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 09-31, supra note 15. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See Zweig, supra note 63. 
 67. Tristan Yates, Dissecting Leveraged ETF Returns, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/exchangetradedfunds/07/leveraged-etf.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 
2010). 
 68. NASDAQ, What Are ETFs?, supra note 16. 
 69. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 09-31, supra note 15. 
2010] Leveraged ETFs 307 
surrounding margin, the basics of its operation, and the rules that regu-
late its use. 
III.  INVESTING ON MARGIN AND MARGIN REGULATIONS 
Investing on margin allows investors to gain leverage by using bor-
rowed funds to purchase stock.70  To facilitate a better understanding of 
margin, this Part discusses the basic mechanics and history of margin as 
well as the rules that currently govern it.  In addition, I will present the 
underlying policies supporting the enactment of margin rules. 
A. Investing on Margin 
Investing on margin means “borrowing money from your broker to 
buy a stock and using your investment as collateral.”71  Investing on 
margin allows investors to buy more stock for less money, creating leve-
rage. 72  Similar to the power of a crowbar to pry out embedded nails be-
cause of its extended length, the enlarged amount of money gained from 
borrowing amplifies the returns that an investor can produce when in-
vesting on margin.  Although leverage increases the potential for greater 
returns, it also increases the potential for greater losses.73 
For example, if a broker allows an investor to borrow 75% of the 
market value of a security, then the investor need only provide 25% of 
the market value.74  Therefore, an investor could purchase $4,000 worth 
of stock on a $1,000 investment.75  If the stock goes up, leverage creates 
an obvious advantage: A 10% increase in the value of the stock produces 
a $400, or 40%, return because of the leverage that the margin loan al-
lows.76  But leverage creates an equally astounding risk if the stock value 
                                                            
 70. See 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.9[4] (6th ed. 2009 & 
Supp. 2010)  (“A margin purchase gives the security holder (investor) leverage, and thus, while 
significantly increasing the risk of investment, also increases the potential gain.”). 
 71. Margin: Borrowing Money to Pay for Stocks, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/margin.htm (last modified Apr. 17, 2009). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.; Christie Ford & Carol Liao, Power Without Property, Still: Unger, Berle, and the De-
rivatives Revolution, 33 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 889, 913–14 (2010). 
 74. See SEC, Margin: Borrowing Money to Pay for Stocks, supra note 71; see also REILLY & 
BROWN, supra note 7, at 128–29. 
 75. Stock worth $4,000 multiplied by the 25% hypothetical initial margin percentage—the 
portion of the purchase price that the investor has to deposit—equals a $1,000 required deposit by 
the investor in order to purchase the stock under this hypothetical. 
 76. The initial value of the stock was $4,000.  An increase of 10%, or $4,000 times 10%, 
equals $400.  The initial amount of cash the investor had to deposit was only $1,000, so the return on 
the investment is the increase of $400 divided by the cash investment of $1,000, or 40%.  However, 
the opposite is true if the stock value decreases by 10%.  The $400 loss is divided by the $1,000 
initial investment, creating a 40% loss.  Additionally, the equity is reduced to $600 because the 
margin loan of $3,000 ($4,000 purchase price less the $1,000 initial cash investment by the investor) 
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goes down.  A 10% decrease in the value of the stock generates a nega-
tive 40% return, leaving the investor with stock valued at $3,600 and a 
debt of the initial $3,000 borrowed.77  Therefore, the investor holds only 
$600 in equity, not counting the interest due on the loan.78  The events 
that caused the Great Depression readily evidence the possible cata-
strophic effects of margin.79 
B. The Origin of Margin Rules and Their Policies 
Buying stock on margin was prominent in the 1920s.80  The post-
World War I U.S. economy flourished, and a wide array of people, com-
panies, and trusts invested in the stock market.81  Since the government 
did not regulate buying on margin,82 brokers controlled margin require-
ments based on concerns for their own well-being.83  In the late 1920s, 
the average broker margin requirement was 50%, but by October 1929, 
investors purchased some stocks with only 25% of the initial price paid.84  
Additionally, interest rates decreased and the number of broker loans 
increased because of the easy access to “cheap” loans.85  Because of their 
expanded buying power, investors drove up stock prices and became 
more vulnerable to stock price declines.86  Moreover, lenders became 
increasingly vulnerable because they depended on the value of stocks as 
collateral.87  Therefore, as stock prices plummeted in late October 1929, 
                                                                                                                                     
has not changed, but the value has decreased by $400.  Therefore, if the stock was sold today for the 
reduced $3,600 value ($4,000 less the $400 loss), then the investor would only be left with $600 
($3,600 new value less the $3,000 loan). 
 77. See supra note 76. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See infra Part III.B. 
 80. Harold Bierman, Jr., The 1929 Stock Market Crash, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA (Feb. 5, 
2010), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/Bierman.Crash. 
 81. See H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 3 (1934) (“Since the war the interest of the public at large in 
the ownership of corporate enterprise has grown bigger, the size of the corporate unit has increased, 
the diffusion of corporate ownership has widened, all correlatively.”). 
 82. Bierman, supra note 80. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  (Interest rates declined making it easier for brokerage firms to obtain money to loan to 
investors and making it less expensive for investors to borrow.). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 4 (1934). 
A rise in the security markets stimulates economic activity in all lines of business, a fall 
in the market precipitates a decline. If the rise in the market is occasioned by an excessive 
use of credit, a decline in the market loosens a process of deflation which feeds on itself 
and ruins not only security prices but all business as well. Between 1922 and 1929 bro-
kers’ loans increased from 1 1/2 billion dollars to 8 1/2 billion dollars. Five billion dollars 
of this increase took place in 3 years, 1 1/2 billion dollars in the last 3 months. In the 
crash of 1929 the same loans declined 3 billion dollars in the first 10 days and 8 billion 
dollars in the next 3 years. These figures alone will enable the economic historian of the 
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investors either sold quickly to minimize losses, thereby exacerbating the 
price declines, or were left owing more than the stock’s value and ulti-
mately defaulted on their margin loans.88  Although other factors contri-
buted, the Great Depression followed.89 
In response to the 1929 stock market crash and subsequent Great 
Depression, Congress enacted margin rules.90  Section 7 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (‘34 Act) set forth rules regulating the purchase of 
securities on margin.91  The margin rules therein, which are discussed in 
the next section, were established based on three basic underlying policy 
considerations: (1) to “prevent[] the excessive use of credit for the pur-
chase or carrying of securities”;92 (2) “to protect the margin purchaser by 
making it impossible for him to buy securities on too thin a margin”;93 
and (3) to “prevent undue market fluctuations and help stabilize the 
economy generally . . . .”94  In short, margin rules were created to protect 
individual investors, the market, and the economy as a whole.95  The me-
                                                                                                                                     
future to describe the unhealthy prosperity of 1929 and the inevitable grief and suffering 
that followed in the succeeding years—grief and suffering that overwhelmed and carried 
away not merely the speculative gains of those who participated in the speculative de-
bauch, not merely the savings of the most frugal and most thrifty invested in securities, 
but eventually the operating profits of every business in the country no matter how unre-
lated to stock exchanges. 
Id. 
 88. See Bierman, supra note 80. 
 89. See supra note 87. 
 90. See H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 3 (1934). 
The [Securities & Exchange Act of 1934] is conceived in a spirit of the truest conservat-
ism. It attempts to change the practices of exchanges and the relationships between listed 
corporations and the investing public to fit modern conditions, for the very purpose that 
they may endure as essential elements of our economic system.  The lesson of 1921–29 is 
that without changes they cannot endure. 
Id. 
 91. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (2009). 
 92. Id. § 78g(a); see also 7 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3225 (3d 
ed. 2003 & Supp. 2010); H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 5 (1934).  (“The causes of dangerous specula-
tion in the securities markets go far deeper than defects and abuses in stock-exchange machinery 
alone.  They include inadequate central control of a national credit system that too easily provides 
for speculation funds which the national welfare much more requires in local commerce, industry, 
and agriculture.”). 
 93. 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 92, at 3225, n.261.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 1 
(1934) (President Roosevelt stated, “In my message to you last March proposing legislation for 
Federal supervision of national traffic in investment securities I said: ‘This is but one step in our 
broad purpose of protecting investors and depositors.’”  He went on to say, “There remains the fact, 
however, that outside the field of legitimate investment naked speculation has been made far too 
alluring and far too easy for those who could and for those who could not afford to gamble.”). 
 94. 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 92, at 3228; see also H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 5 (1934) 
(“Increasing margins—i.e., decreasing the amounts which brokers or banks may lend for the spe-
culative purchase and carrying of stocks—is the most direct and the most effective method of dis-
couraging an abnormal attraction of funds into the stock market.”) 
 95. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
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chanics of the margin rules set out below reflect the efforts of legislators 
and regulators to achieve these policy goals. 
C. Margin Rules 
Congress promulgated the margin rules in order to limit the amount 
an investor can borrow to purchase securities.96  Although investors may 
salivate at the chance to borrow 100% of their investment by putting up 
as collateral the very assets they are borrowing money to purchase, the 
margin rules do not allow investors to borrow all of the cost of a security 
to purchase that security.97 
The margin rules originate in ‘34 Act § 7(a), which establishes a 
complicated system of regulations regarding the extension of credit to 
buy securities.98  Although the ‘34 Act itself sets a ceiling for the initial 
loan amount to purchase securities at 55% of the market value,99 ‘34 Act 
§ 7(a) delegates to the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) the power to set 
regulations regarding the extension of credit for purchasing securities 
where the securities are collateral for the loan.100  The FRB uses this 
grant of authority to adopt a slightly more conservative limit, requiring 
margin of 50%, or “the percentage set by the regulatory authority where 
the trade occurs, whichever is greater.”101  These regulations apply to 
ETFs and leveraged ETFs because they are treated like stock.102 
The FRB requires that designated margin accounts be used when 
investing on margin.103  The broker who manages the account must give 
the customer a margin disclosure statement when the account is opened 
and once a year thereafter.104  Failure to comply with these disclosure 
requirements can result in broker liability for the losses of the custom-
er.105 
The margin requirements mentioned above, however, apply only to 
the initial purchase of securities.106  They do not address the amount re-
                                                            
 96. See supra Part III.B. 
 97. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (2009). 
 98. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION: IN A NUTSHELL 83 (2003). 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a)(1) (2009). 
 100. See id. § 78g(b). 
 101. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.12 (2009). 
 102. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (2009), by default, applies to all securities traded on a 
national securities exchange or actively traded over-the counter.  5 HAZEN, supra note 70, § 14.9[2].  
In addition, “[t]he Federal Reserve Board now provides for the automatic marginability of stocks 
that are part of the Nasdaq’s National Market System.”  Id. 
 103. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(a) (2009). 
 104. 5 HAZEN, supra note 70. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Under §7(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78g (2009), 
Congress gave the Federal Reserve Board the power to impose regulations regarding maintenance 
margin requirements, but the Federal Reserve Board has never exercised this authority.  See 5 
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quired to be maintained in the margin account as collateral for the 
loan.107  Because securities inherently involve more risk and volatility 
than other investments (e.g., homes, electronics, or cars), rules exist re-
quiring investors to maintain a certain amount of equity in the account as 
collateral to cover the potential decline in value of the securities—i.e., 
maintenance margin requirements.108  FINRA sets forth these mainten-
ance margin requirements.109 
FINRA’s current maintenance margin requirement for stock, and 
therefore ETFs, is 25% of the current market value.110  If an investor’s 
equity in the margin account falls below the maintenance margin re-
quirement, then a margin call is issued.111  This means the investor must 
deposit more funds or securities in the margin account or the brokerage 
firm can sell securities in the account until the equity percentage exceeds 
the maintenance margin requirement.112  Thus, the requirement protects 
the lender and the investor by requiring equity in the margin account 
above a certain percentage of the market value and by informing the in-
                                                                                                                                     
HAZEN, supra note 70, § 14.9[1].  Therefore, maintenance margin requirements are left to the ex-
changes and other self-regulatory bodies (e.g. NYSE, NASDAQ, and FINRA).  Id. 
 107. 5 HAZEN, supra note 70, § 14.9[3]. 
 108. See id. § 14.9[1]. 
 109. See About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Abo
utFINRA/index.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).  In July 2007, the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) was consolidated with the regulatory functions of the New York Stock Exchange to 
create the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).  Id.  “It also performs market regula-
tion under contract for The NASDAQ Stock Market, the American Stock Exchange, the Internation-
al Securities Exchange and the Chicago Climate Exchange.”  Id.; see also SEC, Margin: Borrowing 
Money to Pay for Stocks, supra note 71 (“FINRA requires you to keep a minimum amount of equity 
in your margin account.”). 
 110. FINRA MANUAL: NASD RULES § 2520(C) (2010), available at http://finra.complinet.co
m/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3668.  ETFs are included in the NASD 
maintenance margin rules just like any other stock because the rule regulates the margin accounts 
and not the type of security.  See id.  Also, FINRA has incorporated the NYSE rules relating to mar-
gin requirements.  See FINRA MANUAL: INCORPORATED NYSE RULES § 431 (2010), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6461. 
 111. 5 HAZEN, supra note 70, § 14.9[1].  For example, with a maintenance margin requirement 
of 25% an investor must have equity (i.e., difference between the market value of the stock and the 
loan amount) of 25% times the current market value of the stock.  Therefore, if $50,000 worth of 
stock is purchased with an initial margin of 50%, the investor has a loan of $25,000.  If the market 
value of the stock drops to $30,000, the equity is only $5,000 ($30,000 minus $25,000) and the 
maintenance margin requirement is 25% multiplied by the market value, or $7,500 ($30,000 multip-
lied by 25%).  Thus, a margin call for the difference between the equity of $5,000 and the mainten-
ance margin requirement of $7,500, or $2,500, will be received by the investor.  A margin call al-
lows the broker to demand that the investor deposit more cash or more securities or the broker can 
sell the investor’s stock so that the investor’s account is again above the maintenance margin re-
quirement level. 
 112. Investing with Borrowed Funds: No “Margin” for Error, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/MarginAndBorrowing/P005973 (last 
updated Oct. 6, 2008). 
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vestor, through a margin call, of the dangerously low value of the securi-
ties.  Notwithstanding this general rule, FINRA recently changed the 
maintenance margin requirement for leveraged ETFs.113 
In response to mounting pressure to tighten the regulations on leve-
raged ETFs because of their risk and exposure, FINRA recently ap-
proved a more stringent maintenance margin requirement for leveraged 
ETFs.114  The new requirement will increase the former 25% require-
ments by the amount of leverage on the ETF, but not to exceed 100%.115  
Therefore, a 200% leveraged ETF will now have a maintenance margin 
requirement of 50% (25% multiplied by 200%).  In explaining the reason 
for this change, FINRA states: “In view of the increased volatility of le-
veraged ETFs compared to their non-leveraged counterparts, FINRA be-
lieves higher margin levels are necessary.”116 
FINRA’s newly increased maintenance margin requirement is just 
one acknowledgement of the problems and impact leveraged ETFs create 
through their main feature—leverage.  While Congress created margin 
rules to regulate leveraged investing (e.g., margin), leveraged ETFs have 
been allowed to sneak past their application, with potentially harmful 
results.117  The next Part discusses how leveraged ETFs flout the margin 
rules and why this exploitation is inappropriate and dangerous. 
IV.  HOW LEVERAGED ETFS IMITATE INVESTING ON MARGIN AND 
FLOUT THE MARGIN RULES 
While leveraged ETFs produce strikingly similar returns to tradi-
tional margin trading118 and use leverage,119 they are not limited by the 
same margin rules.  As such, leveraged ETFs exploit a gaping hole in the 
margin rules.  This exploitation allows for synthetic margin,120 exponen-
tially larger exposure to risk,121 access to otherwise prohibited leverage 
in retirement accounts,122 and access to investment mechanisms other-
                                                            
 113. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 09-53, NON-TRADITIONAL ETFS: INCREASED MARGIN 
REQUIREMENTS FOR LEVERAGED EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS AND ASSOCIATED UNCOVERED 
OPTIONS (Aug. 2009), http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/not
ices/p119906.pdf. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See infra Part IV. 
 118. Compare supra Part III.C (explains that the purpose of investing on margin is to allow 
investors to have greater purchasing power in order to increase possible returns), with supra Part II.B 
(explains that leveraged ETFs provide exponential returns compared to an underlying asset group so 
that investors can reap greater returns than if the investor just purchased the underlying asset group). 
 119. See supra Part III.C. 
 120. See infra Part IV.A. 
 121. See infra Part IV.C. 
 122. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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wise not available.  Leveraged ETFs should fall within the reach of the 
margin rules because of their similarities to investing on margin.  The 
effects of leveraged ETFs mirror those of investing on margin and impli-
cate the same policy issues.123 
A. Simulated or Synthetic Margin Borrowing 
The purpose of leveraged ETFs is to provide leverage (access to 
greater returns relative to initial investment) to investors.124  Obvious 
from their name, companies promoting leveraged ETFs make this pur-
pose clear in the prospectuses filed with the SEC.  For example, the 
“ProShares UtraPro S&P500 (the ‘Fund’) seeks leveraged investment 
results . . . .  The Fund is different from most exchange-traded funds in 
that it seeks leveraged returns . . . .”125  Leveraged ETFs have “‘leverage’ 
explicitly embedded as part of their product design.”126  Therefore, leve-
raged ETFs and investing on margin have the same purpose—to provide 
greater potential returns through leverage.127 
To solidify the similarities between the two techniques, compare 
investing $1,000 on a 50% margin in the famous SPDRs128 traditional 
ETF that tracks the S&P 500 stock market index129 to investing $1,000 in 
the ProShare Ultra S&P 500 leveraged ETF that tracks the same index 
but with a 200% leverage multiple.130  Excluding the small costs from 
interest, fees, and expenses from investing in these two ETFs, the returns 
from each would be the same in a single day.  If the S&P 500 stock mar-
ket index rose by 1%, each of these investments would generate a 2% 
return.  Both achieve twice the return than that of the underlying index.  
Thus, leveraged ETFs create multiplied returns and losses similar to in-
vesting on margin and, ultimately, seek to achieve the same results.131  
“[L]everaged . . . ETFs can be viewed as pre-packaged margin products, 
albeit without any restrictions on margin eligibility.”132 
Unlike traditional margin trading, however, the investor purchasing 
leveraged ETFs need not borrow money to access the leverage.  The 
funds themselves create leverage through borrowing and derivatives,133 
                                                            
 123. See infra Part IV.D. 
 124. Cheng & Madhavan, supra note 53. 
 125. ULTRAPRO S&P 500: SUMMARY PROSPECTUS, PROSHARES 3 (2009), available at 
http://media.proshares.com/funds/prospectus.html?ticker=upro. 
 126. Cheng & Madhavan, supra note 53. 
 127. See Tom Eidelman, One-Day Wonders, BARRON’S, Jan. 12, 2009, at L8. 
 128. See supra Part II and notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 129. STATE ST. GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 19. 
 130. PROSHARES, supra note 125. 
 131. See Eidelman, supra note 127. 
 132. Cheng & Madhavan, supra note 53, § 2.1. 
 133. See id. 
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allowing the investor to “synthetically” invest on margin.134  Since the 
fund accomplishes the leverage rather than the investor, leveraged ETFs 
do not fall within the margin rules.135  This creates detrimental conse-
quences that the margin rules try to prevent but, as currently constructed, 
cannot.136 
B. Differences and Their Consequences 
Although investors need not borrow to purchase leveraged ETFs,137 
the leverage gained through purchasing a leveraged ETF creates prob-
lems otherwise evaded by the margin rules.138  The investor does not pay 
interest on a loan139 and limits any loss to that of the investment.140  But 
leveraged-ETF fees act similarly to interest costs of investing on margin 
and are used by leveraged ETFs to recoup the costs incurred in creating 
leverage.141  Furthermore, leveraged ETFs and investing on margin inhe-
rently carry enhanced volatility risks because of the leverage they pro-
vide.142  Safeguards such as maintenance margin requirements and eligi-
bility requirements in order to use margin accounts, however, protect the 
investor purchasing on margin.  For example, retirement accounts are 
protected from the risks inherent from investing on margin because of 
the requirements surrounding the use of margin accounts, but leveraged 
ETFs can be purchased in cash accounts.143  Unfortunately, many of the 
protective mechanisms used to limit margin trading do not apply to leve-
raged ETFs.  These include maintenance margin requirements and the 
prohibition on investing on margin in retirement accounts. 
                                                            
 134. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1356 (2d ed. 1987) (“3. 
not real or genuine; artificial; feigned”). 
 135. Cf. Scott Rothbort, How Leveraged ETFs Flout Margin Requirements, REALMONEY 
SILVER (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.thefinanceprofessor.com/ArticleFiles/16how%20etfs%20flout%
20margin%20rules.pdf (approval for leveraged ETFs comes from the SEC and the Federal Reserve 
Board has no say over the matter).  In addition, investors do not purchase the leveraged ETFs with 
borrowed funds, so technically traditional margin rules do not extend to leveraged ETFs.  See supra 
Part II.B. 
 136. See Rothbort, supra note 135. 
 137. See Cheng & Madhavan, supra note 53, § 1. 
 138. See Rothbort, supra note 135. 
 139. Because the investor does not have to borrow money to purchase a leveraged ETF, there 
will be no direct interest charged as there would be on a loan. 
 140. See Cheng & Madhavan, supra note 53, § 1. 
 141. See id. § 2.1 (implementing a leveraged strategy may implicate financing costs). 
 142. See Eidelman, supra note 127. 
 143. A cash account is an account with a broker where the investor is required to purchase 
securities up front without borrowed funds.  What to Expect When You Open a Brokerage Account, 
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Investors/SmartInvesting/GettingStarted/OpeningaBrokerageAccount/i
ndex.htm (last visited July 5, 2010). 
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1.  Maintenance Margin Requirements 
Leveraged ETFs provide synthetic margin without the protections 
of the margin call discussed in Part III.144  Although only the initial in-
vestment in a leveraged ETF can be lost (if not purchased on margin), 
there is no safeguard to slow down a decline.  Unlike investing on mar-
gin, when underlying assets decline in value and the leveraged ETF mul-
tiplies the decline by its leverage ratio, the leveraged-ETF investor rece-
ives no warning of the drastic decrease in value of the investment.145  
Therefore, if an investor does not monitor the leveraged ETF frequently, 
the investor can quickly lose most of the investment with no warning or 
safeguard. 
Notwithstanding the lack of safeguards against drastic and swift 
losses, retirement accounts are currently allowed to be exposed to these 
risks through the use of leveraged ETFs even though they are prohibited 
from investing on margin.146 
2.  Retirement Accounts Allowed Access to Otherwise 
Prohibited Leverage 
Individual retirement accounts (IRAs) are not allowed to be in-
vested on margin147 because IRAs cannot be pledged as collateral.148  As 
discussed above in Part II, investors must use a margin account with their 
broker, not a traditional cash account, in order to invest on margin, and 
margin accounts require the account to be pledged as collateral for the 
margin loans given by the broker.149  The tax advantages provided to 
IRAs are lost, however, if the IRA is pledged as security because pledg-
ing the IRA, or a portion thereof, is considered a distribution and subject 
to taxes and penalties.150 
Congress prohibited the use of these accounts as collateral because 
the tax advantages given to IRAs are meant to help individuals save for 
                                                            
 144. See Rothbort, supra note 135. 
 145. When investing on margin, the maintenance margin rules might protect the investor from 
total loss.  See supra Part III.C. 
 146. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 147. See 26 U.S.C. § 408(e)(4) (2009); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.408-1(c)(4) (2009).  Investing on 
margin must be done through a margin account, which requires the account to be collateral for any 
loans.  5 HAZEN, supra note 70, § 14.9[1].  An individual retirement account cannot be pledged as 
security for loan or that portion is deemed distributed and the tax advantages are lost.  
26 U.S.C. § 408(e)(4) (2009).  Therefore, because the individual retirement account in a margin 
account would have to be pledged as security for a margin loan, the tax advantages would be lost. 
 148. 26 U.S.C. § 408(e)(4) (2009). 
 149. FINRA, What to Expect When You Open a Brokerage Account, supra note 143. 
 150. See 26 U.S.C. § 408(e)(4) (2009). 
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retirement.151  Preventing IRAs from investing on margin reduces the 
risk of losing retirement savings and protects the government from pro-
viding support to individuals later in life.152  Unfortunately, under the 
current regulatory scheme, an IRA can purchase leveraged ETFs.153  Le-
veraged ETFs are treated like a stock,154 and IRAs are allowed to invest 
in stock through cash accounts.  Therefore, although people cannot invest 
IRAs on margin to leverage the purchasing power,155 retirement accounts 
can purchase leveraged ETFs and gain exposure to the leverage offered. 
The government’s goal of mitigating undue risk when investing re-
tirement savings seems reasonable and worthwhile.156  The government 
will forgo tax revenue in return for increased savings and responsible 
investing.157  The opportunity for multiplied gains is forfeited, but the 
corresponding risk of losing retirement savings, earmarked for the future 
when the person generates little or no income,158 outweighs the possible 
benefit.  Increased gains may allow for the individual to live better dur-
ing retirement, but substantial losses may require the American populous 
to make up the loss. 
The ability to purchase leveraged ETFs in IRAs does not comport 
with the policies behind safeguarding tax-advantaged retirement savings 
from the undue risk just discussed.159  IRAs are subject to restrictions on 
pledging the accounts as collateral for a loan to avoid unnecessary risk of 
loss.160  As discussed above, the purpose of leveraged ETFs is to provide 
the opportunity to garner large gains, which is accompanied by the cor-
responding risk of suffering large losses.161  Allowing individuals to ex-
pose themselves to increased risk of loss through a new and complex 
                                                            
 151. 5 WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 385 (2d ed. 2004) (“To help people prepare 
for retirement, Congress in 1974 established individual retirement accounts [IRAs] . . . .”) [hereinaf-
ter WEST ENCYCLOPEDIA]. 
 152. See id.  “[A] substantial number of politicians, economists, and scholars contend that the 
Social Security fund is being drained faster than it is being filled, and that it will go broke in a num-
ber of years, leaving retirees to survive without government assistance.”  Id. 
 153. See Rothbort, supra note 135. 
 154. See supra Part II.B. 
 155. See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text. 
 157. WEST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 151, at 388 (“The goal of ERTA [Economic Recovery 
Tax Act] was to promote an increased level of personal retirement savings through uniform discre-
tionary savings arrangements.”). 
 158. Id.  Because of the increase in the average life span and the decline in the number of em-
ployers that offer retirement plans, individuals may need more retirement savings than their ances-
tors.  Id. 
 159. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See SEC, Leveraged and Inverse ETFs: Specialized Products with Extra Risks for Buy-
and-Hold Investors, supra note 47. 
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investment vehicle (leveraged ETF), while prohibiting the same risk ex-
posure through traditional and simple borrowing, defies logic and reason. 
C. Margin Times Leverage Equals “Super Margin” 
In addition to the built-in leverage, leveraged ETFs can be pur-
chased on margin themselves.162  Thus, an investor can purchase a leve-
raged ETF, created to provide embedded leverage, on margin.  This 
creates “super margin.”163  For example, if an investor purchases a 200% 
leveraged ETF with a margin requirement of 50%, the resulting exposure 
is 400%, or 4-to-1.  Furthermore, if a triple-leveraged ETF is purchased 
on the same margin, then the leverage is truly 600%, or 6-to-1.164 
Because Congress and regulating agencies, through the ‘34 Act and 
Regulation T,165 set margin requirements that cap the total possible leve-
rage exposure to approximately two times the investment,166 how can 
leveraged ETFs be allowed to provide leverage of six times an invest-
ment?  The answer is unclear.  Nonetheless, access to this amount of le-
verage seems to blatantly defy the policies underlying the margin 
rules.167  These policies, and how leveraged ETFs contradict them, are 
discussed below. 
D.  Contradiction of Margin-Rule Policies through Leveraged ETFs 
Leveraged ETFs leave the margin rules partially ineffective in 
achieving their underlying policy initiatives of protecting individual in-
vestors, the market, and the economy as a whole.  How each of these 
three policies is undermined by leveraged ETFs deserves discussion. 
                                                            
 162. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 09-53, supra note 113. 
 163. The term “super margin” is not a term of art or a term readily used in the investment 
community.  However, I will use this term to indicate the ability to combine the embedded leverage 
of a leveraged ETF with the leverage obtained through buying a leveraged ETF on margin. 
 164. See Rothbort, supra note 135. 
 165. Regulation T is another name for the regulations found in 12 C.F.R. § 220 (2009). 
Regulation T (this part) is issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem (the Board) pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act) (15 U.S.C.78a 
et seq.).  Its principal purpose is to regulate extensions of credit by brokers and dealers; it 
also covers related transactions within the Board’s authority under the Act.  It imposes, 
among other obligations, initial margin requirements and payment rules on certain securi-
ties transactions. 
12 C.F.R. § 220.1 (2009). 
 166. See supra Part III.C. 
 167. See Rothbort, supra note 135. 
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1.  Excessive Use of Credit to Purchase Securities 
How leveraged ETFs contradict the first policy consideration, the 
prevention of the overuse of credit to purchase securities,168 is not imme-
diately obvious.  The policy is grounded in the risk of committing too 
much of the nation’s resources into the stock market and out of the hands 
of normal loan transactions.169  Leveraged ETFs contradict this policy 
because the underlying mechanics of leveraged ETFs cause the same 
result as if numerous investors borrowed funds to generate leverage in 
the traditional sense.  Thus, the funds absorb a large amount of resources 
that could be put to other productive uses.170  As two employees of Bar-
clays Global Investors stated, “[L]everaged returns cannot be created out 
of thin air . . . .”171  Therefore, committing too much of the nation’s re-
sources to the stock market simply shifts the party committing the re-
sources from the final investor up the chain to the leveraged ETF. 
2.  Protect Investors from Buying on Too Thin of Margin 
During the enactment of the ‘34 Act, the chairman of the House 
Commerce Committee stated that “[a] reasonably high margin require-
ment is essential so that a person cannot get in the market on a shoe 
string one day and be one of the sheared lambs when he wakes up the 
next morning.”172  In other words, an investor should be protected from 
too much risk. 
As indicated in the discussion thus far, leveraged ETFs have the 
same effects as investing on margin but lack many of the same safe-
guards.173  Leveraged ETFs provide synthetic margin,174 allow for “super 
margin” when purchased on margin themselves,175 and even allow re-
tirement accounts access to leverage previously unobtainable.176  These 
characteristics, coupled with the investor’s ability to purchase leveraged 
ETFs and gain a multiple of two or three times the normal returns of the 
underlying assets, demonstrate that leveraged ETFs allow everyday in-
                                                            
 168. See supra Part III.B. 
 169. 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 92. 
 170. See H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 5 (1934) (The House was concerned about the use of credit 
to supply resources to the stock market and not to “local commerce, industry, and agriculture.”). 
 171. Cheng & Madhavan, supra note 53, § 3.1.  Leveraged ETFs generally rely on total return 
swaps, futures, or even trading on margin to create the leverage they promise.  Id.  Defining and 
discussing these types of complex derivative investments is beyond the scope of this Comment, but 
it is sufficient to state that these derivatives require actual loans or loan-like contracts that expose the 
leveraged ETF to margin risks. 
 172. 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 92, at 3226. 
 173. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 174. See supra Part IV.A. 
 175. See supra Part IV.C. 
 176. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
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vestors exposure to heightened risk.177  This is precisely what the legisla-
ture aimed to avoid. 
3.  Protect Market Stability 
Congress’s third goal was to avoid excessive market fluctuations 
and stabilize the economy by use of margin rules.178  The underlying as-
sumption is that volatility increases with the untamed use of margin.179  
Margin rules protect this policy by limiting initial margin so that inves-
tors cannot impact market prices significantly more than their own buy-
ing power would allow.180  In addition, maintenance margin requirements 
ensure that brokers can sell the collateral (stock) before the collateral is 
worth less than the loan given, thereby limiting the risk of lender volatili-
ty.181  In order for leveraged ETFs to negatively impact this policy con-
cern, however, they must substantially contribute to market volatility. 
Leveraged ETFs have been accused of being a major driving force 
in market volatility, especially at the end of the trading day.182  The most 
likely explanation is the rebalancing of leverage, which occurs at the end 
of the day.  Leveraged ETFs rebalance their leverage so that they can 
reset and provide the desired leverage the following trading day.  Reba-
lancing requires the purchase or sale of large amounts of shares.183  The 
idea is that for a leveraged ETF to honor its multiple (e.g., 200%) return 
promised, it must buy or sell in the last few minutes of the day to realign 
its leverage scheme.184  For example, if a leveraged ETF seeks a 200% 
return and has $100 million dollars of assets at the beginning of the day it 
must have started with market exposure of $200 million in order to 
achieve 200% leverage.  If the fund then increases by $10 million during 
the day, it must increase its exposure to $220 million.185  Therefore, 
$20 million of buy orders will be processed at the end of the day in order 
to readjust the leverage exposure to obtain the desired double return.  
                                                            
 177. See Eric Uhlfelder, Do You Really Need All That Risk?, BARRON’S, Oct. 12, 2009, at L10. 
 178. 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 92, at 3228. 
 179. Roberta S. Karmel, The Rashomon Effect in the After-The-Crash Studies, 21 REV. SEC. & 
COMMODITIES REG. 101, 106 (1988), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1988/092188gru
ndfest.pdf. 
 180. See 15 U.S.C. § 78g (2009). 
 181. See 5 HAZEN, supra note 70, § 14.9[1], n.7. 
 182. Zweig, supra note 63. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. The increase to $220 million would be necessary because in order to achieve a 2-to-1 
return, the amount of exposure the fund has must be double that of its assets.  In this example the 
fund started with $100 million in assets so its exposure would need to be double that, or $200 mil-
lion.  After a return of $10 million the fund would have $110 million in assets and would need expo-
sure of double that, or $220 million. 
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Although there is continuing debate about whether rebalancing at the end 
of the trading day drives market volatility,186 the fact that two or three 
times the number of shares have to be purchased in order to maintain the 
leverage increases the power of leveraged ETFs to affect prices in the 
market. 
Even if leveraged ETFs do not substantially contribute to market 
volatility due to releveraging, they do substantially contravene the other 
two policy grounds for the margin rules: (1) reducing excessive use of 
funds to buy securities so that funds are available for other areas of na-
tional growth and (2) protecting investors from losing too much too 
fast.187  Additionally, leveraged ETFs serve substantially the same pur-
pose and create substantially the same result as investing on margin.188  
Therefore, because leveraged ETFs look the same as investing on mar-
gin, act the same as investing on margin, and provoke the same policy 
concerns as investing on margin, they should not be allowed to skirt 
around laws designed to control and regulate leverage—i.e., margin 
rules. 
V. PROPOSALS 
Numerous solutions exists, some more drastic than others, for solv-
ing the problem of leveraged ETFs defying the margin rules.189  Al-
though prohibiting leveraged ETFs altogether would resolve concerns, 
this solution ignores the current large-scale use of leveraged ETFs and 
the possible benefits for sophisticated investors.190  Instead, a balanced 
solution to align leveraged ETFs with the margin rules is appropriate.191  
As a result, multiple changes in combination should be instigated to 
create broad and effective change.192 
First, the FRB should add leveraged ETFs to the list of non-
marginable securities.193  The problem of combining the embedded leve-
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rage in leveraged ETFs with the leverage created through margin194 
would be solved by simply barring leveraged ETFs from being purchased 
on margin.  Six-to-one leverage would no longer be available.195  Adding 
leveraged ETFs to the list of nonmarginable securities, however, does not 
stop retirement accounts from accessing leverage196 and does not address 
many of the policy critiques noted in Part IV.D.  Therefore, more needs 
to be done. 
Second, IRAs should be barred from using leveraged ETFs.197  This 
could easily be accomplished by requiring brokers to prohibit retirement 
accounts (like IRAs) from buying leveraged ETFs.198  Because investing 
is trending dramatically toward the use of online computer trading sys-
tems,199 the broker could presumably create a program tool to block re-
tirement accounts from accessing trades for leveraged ETFs.200  But, like 
the first alternative above, this solution only addresses some of the prob-
lems.201 
Third, leveraged ETFs could be capped at 200% of the underlying 
asset group.  Such a cap would effectively limit exposure to roughly the 
same leverage allowed by current margin rules, which allow 50% initial 
margin.202  Capping the leverage ratio alone does not address the issues 
of super margin203 and retirement account access to leverage.204  Com-
bined with the alternatives above, however, it would substantially rein-
force the original policy goals of the margin rules.205 
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Fourth, investor eligibility requirements to invest in leveraged ETFs 
should be imposed.206  These requirements could range from mandated 
training courses207 to separate agreements with a brokerage firm in order 
to assure that investors acquire a general understanding of the risks.208  
Investors purchasing leveraged ETFs normally do not understand209 or 
have access to the types of derivatives that these funds use to achieve 
their purposes; therefore, investors should be made aware of the com-
plexity and risks involved before purchasing.  In addition, by requiring 
additional action, investors uninterested in or insufficiently educated on 
the existence or workings of leveraged ETFs would be less likely to go 
through the steps required to gain access to leveraged ETFs.  Just as the 
freedom of individuals to take risks and use their assets as they wish in a 
gambling setting requires reasonable regulation and limitation, access to 
leveraged ETFs demands more limitation as well. 
Each of the proposed solutions herein possesses independent bene-
fits.  But collectively, the changes would bring effective solutions to the 
problems created by leverage going unchecked by the margin rules.  Tak-
ing action to limit access to and use of leveraged ETFs reaffirms a com-
mitment to the original policy considerations of the margin rules. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Leveraged ETFs are prepackaged margin products that provide 
multiplied returns similar to investing on margin but without all the pro-
tections of the margin rules.  The margin rules were adopted to protect 
investors, reduce the amount of resources injected in the stock market, 
and secure market stability.  But leveraged ETFs are not regulated to en-
sure these policies are upheld.  For example, although leveraged ETFs 
provide multiplied returns similar to investing on margin, they are not 
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limited to the same leverage exposure as those investing on margin.  
Tax-advantaged retirement accounts are denied access to margin to safe-
guard against undue risk of retirement savings losses but are allowed to 
purchase leveraged ETFs that offer similar volatility, risk, and leverage.  
Furthermore, Congress limited initial margin to a 2-to-1 leverage ratio, 
but leveraged ETFs provide up to 3-to-1 leverage ratio and even higher 
when purchased on margin. 
Access to and use of leveraged ETFs must be limited in order to re-
tain the policies of the margin rules originating from lessons of the Great 
Depression and other financial disasters.  By prohibiting leveraged ETFs 
from being purchased on margin, from being available through retire-
ment accounts, from being offered at more than a 2-to-1 leverage ratio, 
and from being purchased without prior knowledge of the complexity 
and risks involved, investors, the market, and the economy will be 
stronger and safer. 
